| Metin PEKTAŞ Competition Law Partner | Zehra Ahsen KAYACI Lawyer |
| Hüseyin Taha KAYA Lawyer | Oğuzhan TUĞLA Trainee Lawyer |
ABSTRACT Labour markets have become an area that has expanded the scope of application of competition law particularly in recent years and has entered prominently onto the agenda of competition authorities. In this context, agreements that restrict competition by object, such as wage-fixing and no-poaching agreements which limit worker mobility and indirectly adversely affect consumer welfare, are accepted as serious/per se violations. Furthermore, the view has gained prominence that no-poaching clauses contained in supply, service, licence and franchise agreements should not be characterised as direct serious violations, but rather should be subject to a “rule of reason” analysis, which is an effects-based form of analysis. Nevertheless, both globally and in Turkey, competition authorities are meticulously examining provisions in employment contracts that may restrict worker mobility and continuing discussions on “ancillary restraints”. Additionally, contemporary areas of debate have emerged, such as whether non-compete clause provisions imposed on employees as a contractual obligation can be evaluated as anti-competitive agreements, or whether the collective transfer of employees playing a key role for an undertaking can be assessed as a de facto acquisition transaction. With regard to information exchange, the Labour Guide published by the Competition Board in Turkey has provided certain guiding criteria concerning the sharing of competitively sensitive information between undertakings.
Keywords: Labour, Wage-Fixing Agreements, No-Poaching Agreements, Ancillary Restraints, Non-Compete Agreements, Mergers and Acquisitions.
INTRODUCTION
Whether labour markets fall within the scope of application of competition law has long been a subject of debate among both labour law practitioners and competition law practitioners. Particularly in recent years, decisions rendered by competition authorities and guidelines published have demonstrated that labour markets are not positioned differently from other markets. In other words, competition laws also find application in markets where the input is labour/workforce, and authorities approach potential competition violations from the same perspective. In competitive goods and services markets, undertakings competing on price and price-related matters also compete in labour markets with respect to wages and wage-affecting factors in order to retain their employees or employ each other’s workers. Just as anti-competitive agreements are made in goods and services markets to keep prices fixed and jointly determine price-related conditions, anti-competitive agreements are also made in labour markets to keep employee wages fixed, jointly determine working conditions, and prevent employee transfers. While these agreements are sometimes exempted from competition law (such as no-poaching provisions in employment contracts that are ancillary restraint in nature or collective bargaining agreements serving a social purpose), agreements made with competitors that restrict competition “by object” are assessed as “cartels”. This study will first address the historical development of competition law in labour markets, then discuss the market structure and main competition law issues in the market, and finally refer to the precedents adopted in decisions rendered by competition authorities and the guidelines they have published.
I. Historical Development
Since 1994 in the United States, no-poaching and no-hiring agreements have entered the agenda of competition authorities. In 2007, hospitals in Arizona fixing nurse wages¹, in 2010, Silicon Valley companies’ agreements not to poach each other’s employees were deemed competition violations² and the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division (“DOJ”) evaluated these agreements as per se violations³. In 2016, the DOJ and the US Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) published a Guide⁴ stating that such agreements are illegal. In 2024, the FTC published the Non-Compete Rule prohibiting non-compete obligations imposed on employees, however this regulation was invalidated by a Texas court. In early 2025, the FTC and DOJ published a new Guide⁵ addressing competition violations in labour markets more comprehensively in place of the 2016 Guide. In 2024, the European Commission announced it would not take a decision regarding Microsoft’s transfer of critical employees of Inflection AI, Inc; however, the UK Competition Authority CMA and the German Competition Authority Bundeskartellamt assessed the said transaction within the scope of merger/acquisition. In Turkey, with the 2005 TV series producers decision⁶, in the preliminary investigation where prevention of employee transfers and fixing of employee wages were detected, the first warnings were given to undertakings regarding competition violations in labour markets. Subsequently, in 2011, in the preliminary investigations of private schools⁷ and chemical companies⁸, the prevention of employee transfers was also evaluated within the scope of competition law. In 2020, in the container transportation decision⁹, it was determined that employee salaries were jointly determined and this preliminary investigation, like previous preliminary investigations, was concluded with a warning for the undertakings. In 2022, with the Private Hospitals decision¹⁰, the Competition Board opened its first investigation relating to the labour market and imposed administrative fines on undertakings on the grounds that they jointly determined healthcare workers’ wages and made agreements not to transfer employees. As of 2023, the Competition Board, with its decisions, has signalled that it accepts wage-fixing and explicit no-poaching agreements as “cartels” and will maintain this stance in future decisions. In another reasoned decision published in 2024¹¹, the Board determined that five Private French Schools in Turkey violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition by jointly determining school fees and Turkish teacher salaries and formed a “cartel”; and ruled that administrative fines be imposed on the said undertakings.
II. Market Structure / Definition
In the labour market where workers are the sellers of labour and employers are the buyers, it can be stated that employers possess monopsony power and that “power imbalance” between worker and employer is excessively pronounced. One of the biggest indicators of this imbalance is that labour supply elasticity in the market is low, in other words, workers’ reaction to changes in wages/salaries (resignation, strike, etc.) is low.¹² Consequently, employers who are in the position of buyers of labour in the labour market have greater bargaining power than workers/employees who are in the position of sellers of labour. Employers’ ability to unilaterally affect employees’ wages often drives them to agreements and actions in the market that restrict competition, such as wage-fixing. Additionally, the concentrated structure in the labour market and the monopsony power possessed by employers may give rise to certain competitive concerns particularly with regard to abuse of dominant position and mergers and acquisitions.¹³
III. Main Competition Law Issues Relating to the Labour Market
The main competition law issues in the labour market may arise around the following topics: i) anti-competitive agreements (wage-fixing agreements, no-poaching agreements) ii) exchange of competitively sensitive information concerning employees iii) ancillary restraints iv) non-compete agreements v) abuse of dominant position and vi) mergers and acquisitions. Current developments regarding the aforementioned topics will be addressed sequentially in the sections below.
• Anti-Competitive Agreements
a. Wage-Fixing Agreements
Wage-fixing agreements parallel price-fixing agreements in goods and services markets. In a labour market where employees’ wages are fixed, employees’ motivation to change jobs will be undermined and worker mobility will be restricted. Such agreements bear similarity to price agreements in goods and services markets.
b. No-Poaching Agreements
No-poaching agreements are agreements made between employers not to hire each other’s employees. It is possible to divide no-poaching agreements into two as explicit and implicit no-poaching agreements. These agreements sometimes appear as independent inter-competitor agreements separate from the main contract and sometimes as a provision of the main contract. However, no-poaching provisions in certain vertical agreements (licence, franchise, etc.) may be accepted as an ancillary restraint that is necessary for the existence and continuity of the agreement, directly related to the agreement and proportionate. In this regard, while explicit no-poaching agreements that restrict competition by object (naked no-poach agreements) are accepted as per se violations in the United States, implicit no-poaching agreements are subject to rule of reason analysis¹⁴ where the effects arising from the conduct are also taken into consideration. Although such a distinction is not explicitly made by other competition authorities worldwide, it can be stated that the understanding in Europe and Turkey also approximates this understanding in the United States.
c. Competition Board Decisions
The first decision in Turkey relating to the labour market resulting in an administrative fine is the Private Hospitals decision taken in 2022 regarding allegations that private hospitals jointly determined physician wages and prevented physician transfers. From this decision onwards, the Competition Board has begun to classify wage-fixing and no-poaching agreements as “cartels”. Additionally, in the French Schools decision where school fees and teacher salaries were determined, wage-fixing agreements are also assessed as “cartels” by the Competition Board. Some of the said current decisions are as follows:
» Technology Companies Decision¹⁵: The Competition Board decided in 2023 to impose administrative fines on 16 undertakings including Hepsiburada, Yemeksepeti, Çiçeksepeti, Türk Telekom and Vodafone on the grounds that they made gentlemen’s agreements not to hire employees from each other and that these agreements constituted a cartel. Within the scope of the investigation, 11 undertakings applied for settlement.
» Information Technologies and Computing Companies Decision¹⁶: The investigation opened in 2023 against 8 undertakings operating in the field of information technologies and software including Turkcell, Ericsson, Netas and Geti on the grounds that they made gentlemen’s agreements was concluded in February 2024 with a decision to impose administrative fines on the undertakings. In this decision, the Board evaluated gentlemen’s agreements containing no-poaching provisions as “cartels”.
» Pharmaceutical Companies Decision¹⁷: In the investigation opened in 2023 against undertakings operating in the pharmaceutical sector, it was determined that competitor undertakings were in agreement/concerted practice by making gentlemen’s agreements not to hire each other’s employees and engaging in competitively sensitive information exchange. These agreements were evaluated as “cartels” by the Board. In 2024, the said investigation was concluded with settlement for GSK, Abdiibrahim, Bilim İlaç, Drogsan. For other undertakings, the investigation is still ongoing.
» French Schools Decision¹⁸: The Competition Board, in the investigation it opened with the allegation that five Private French Schools in Turkey jointly determined school fees and Turkish teacher salaries, ruled that administrative fines be imposed on the said undertakings on the grounds that they violated Article 4 of Law No. 4054 and formed a “cartel”. As a result of its evaluations, the Board reached the opinion that the undertakings jointly decided on school prices, scholarships and conditions relating to scholarships and jointly determined teacher wages through inter-undertaking agreement.
» Casting Agencies Investigation¹⁹: The Competition Board decided in December 2024 to open an investigation against KASTDER and 20 casting agencies with the allegations that the Casting agencies association (KASTDER) and casting agencies jointly determined commission rates and sales conditions and made a boycott call against a production company. With the said decisions, the Competition Board demonstrates that making wage-fixing agreements between undertakings competing for labour in labour markets, preventing transfer of employees by making gentlemen’s agreements between undertakings, and depriving employees of job opportunities offering higher wages and better conditions will harm the competitive structure of the market.
• Ancillary Restraints
Ancillary restraints can be defined as restrictions that do not constitute the essence of the main agreement but are directly related to the main agreement, proportionate and necessary to achieve the desired objectives. Various decisions have been rendered by authorities regarding “no-poaching provisions” contained in main contracts as an ancillary restraint. For example, in decisions rendered by the FTC and DOJ in the United States, not all no-poaching provisions in contracts were deemed violations.²⁰ The European Commission similarly has not characterised such restrictions as direct violations.²¹ In Turkey as well, in many of its decisions regarding merger and acquisition transactions, the Competition Board has examined provisions on no-poaching and accepted these provisions as ancillary restraints rather than as anti-competitive agreements. However, no decision of the Board has been encountered where it accepted a no-poaching agreement as an ancillary restraint outside of merger and acquisition transactions.²² Indeed, the Board has rendered decisions stating that the relevant restriction should be narrowed in cases where no-poaching provisions exceed limitations necessary for the transaction particularly in terms of duration.²³ Consequently, if ancillary restraints do not satisfy the conditions of necessity, direct relatedness and proportionality, they may exceed their purpose and may also be evaluated as anti-competitive restrictions. Additionally, in decisions rendered in the United States²⁴, it has been concluded that rule of reason analysis should be conducted for no-poaching provisions in the form of ancillary restraints contained in vertical agreements (e.g., service, licence, franchise agreements).
• Non-Compete Agreements
A non-compete agreement or provision is a clause contained in an employment contract that prohibits the employee from entering or starting a similar profession or trade competing with the employer in a certain period and certain geographical area during and/or after the termination of the employment contract. A non-compete agreement restricts job mobility by prohibiting the employee from working with competitors operating in the same sector and thus seriously restricts competition. In this context, one of the significant developments regarding labour market competition violations published by the FTC in April 2024, the Final Rule²⁵ (NPRM) and the invalidation of the said decision by the Texas Court will be conveyed in detail.
• Abuse of Dominant Position
“Dominant position” is addressed in a different manner in labour markets. Since unlike goods and services markets, in labour markets all employers are in competition with respect to employing workers even if they do not operate in the same sector. Accordingly, when dominant position assessment is made, it will not only be evaluated whether the undertaking is in a dominant position solely in the sector in which it operates; its dominant position in the labour market will also be taken into consideration. Additionally, since abuse of dominant position by an undertaking in labour markets may manifest in different ways, competition violations will be subject to an evaluation taking into account the characteristics specific to the concrete case.²⁶ With regard to which behaviours will be characterised as abuse in the labour market, it can particularly be stated that “predatory hiring” may be accepted as one of the abusive behaviours. Predatory hiring may manifest as a dominant undertaking keeping employee wages very high to a level that will exclude its competitors from the market, offering very low wages since it remains as the single player in the market, or employing a competitor’s key employees without need thereby excluding the competitor from the market.²⁷
• Mergers and Acquisitions
∘ Microsoft & Inflection Decision
The European Commission announced in March 2024 that it would not take a decision regarding Microsoft’s transaction to transfer employees of Inflection AI, Inc. (“Inflection”), an artificial intelligence start-up.²⁸ The United Kingdom competition authority CMA and the German competition authority Bundeskartellamt, however, concluded in their decisions²⁹ that such employee transfers could be characterised as “merger/acquisition”. The UK competition authority CMA, in the investigation it conducted regarding Microsoft’s acquisition of Inflection’s assets and employees, determined that the said transaction was in the nature of an “acquisition” according to United Kingdom law. The said transaction involved Microsoft hiring almost the entire team of Inflection including its co-founders and making non-exclusive licence agreements to use Inflection’s intellectual property. Since Microsoft effectively had control over a significant portion of Inflection’s commercial activities pre-transaction, CMA accepted this as a merger/acquisition transaction rather than a simple staff transfer. However, CMA concluded that the transaction did not carry a risk of significantly restricting competition and permitted the transaction. Bundeskartellamt, in its evaluations, also reached the conclusion that the acquisition of the workforce and the conditions regulating the use of Inflection’s core intellectual property rights by Microsoft meant that Inflection was de facto acquired by Microsoft and was subject to control. In this regard, different contracts between Microsoft and Inflection and between Microsoft and Inflection’s shareholders were examined, however Bundeskartellamt discontinued the investigation since the thresholds necessary for examination of the acquisition could not be reached.
IV. Competition Authority – Labour Guide
For the purpose of ensuring legal certainty and predictability, a “Draft Guide on Competition Law Violations in the Labour Market” was first prepared by the Competition Authority and opened to public opinion. The Draft Guide revised within the scope of feedback received from the public was subsequently discussed at the Competition Board’s session dated 21 November 2024 and the final “Guide on Competition Violations in the Labour Market” was adopted. In the Guide, types of competition violations in labour markets are addressed under the headings of (i) no-poaching agreements, (ii) wage-fixing agreements and (iii) information exchange within the scope of Article 4 of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition, subsequently evaluations are presented regarding ancillary restraints and other articles of the Law. The Guide states that no-poaching and wage-fixing agreements will be accepted as cartels. In addition to these anti-competitive agreements, particular attention has been drawn to the following matters especially regarding information exchange:
• It has been emphasised that information exchange can be conducted directly between undertakings as well as through a third-party channel such as intermediary institutions and platforms, market research companies. In this context, it has been stated that sharing of information between undertakings that is not aggregated, is current and/or forward-looking, enables understanding of the data source or the content of the data individually and is not public may restrict competition.
• For information exchange not to produce anti-competitive effects, it has been stated that it must carry the following conditions:
» Information exchange must be conducted by an independent third party,
» It must not be possible to understand the data source or individual data content,
» Information subject to information exchange must relate to at least three months prior,
» Information must contain data of at least ten participants,
» No participant’s data must have weight exceeding 25% in the total data.
Regarding ancillary restraints, dominant position and merger and acquisition transactions;
» It has been expressed that restrictions determined to be ancillary restraints will not be evaluated within the scope of Article 4 of the Law; however, restrictions on no-poaching and wage-fixing determined not to bear ancillary restraint nature will be accepted as violations by object,
» In evaluations regarding abuse of dominant position, it will be examined whether the undertaking under investigation is in a dominant position both in the relevant product or service market and in the relevant labour market,
» It has been expressed that whether merger and acquisition transactions reduce competition in the labour market will be evaluated within the framework of various criteria such as whether the relevant transaction carries the possibility of killer acquisition.
V. Current Areas of Debate
• Ancillary Restraints
Regarding theoretical debates on to what extent no-poaching provisions will be evaluated within the scope of ancillary restraints; in United States decisions, in summary, inter-competitor agreements on wages and fringe benefits and no-poaching agreements aimed solely at restricting employee circulation are accepted as “per se violations”, thus a narrow/categorical interpretation is adopted here. However, in the said decisions, it has been raised that in cases where the no-poaching agreement appears as an obligation – an ancillary restraint – attached to a separate contractual relationship such as supply, service, work, licence, franchise agreement, it may essentially have competition-enhancing results. In decisions rendered on the subject in the United States, it has been concluded that “rule of reason” analysis should be conducted for no-poaching provisions brought as an obligation attached to the said contractual relationships. However, it can still be stated that this matter has not been fully clarified. For example, in Deslandes v. McDonald’s in the United States, the defendants argued that the no-poaching provision was part of the franchise agreement and was a necessary ancillary restraint and that this provision should be evaluated within the scope of rule of reason. The Court, however, reached the opinion that no-poaching provisions in franchise agreements may be of a horizontal nature and unless it is proven by the defendants that such provisions were added to the franchise agreement as an ancillary restraint reasonably necessary to achieve a competitive objective, they may be characterised as per se violations.³⁰ In Turkey, it will not be possible to give a clear answer to the questions of under which circumstances no-poaching provisions in contracts will be accepted as “ancillary restraints” and whether they will benefit from the presumption of legality even with the recently published Guide. However, decisions to be rendered on labour markets in the future may shed light on the subject.
• Non-Compete Agreements
Non-compete agreements, which are usually incorporated into contracts between employee and employer and by the nature of the provision restrict employees’ freedom of movement, have become a subject of debate globally with respect to competition law with the Final Decision rendered by the FTC. In this context, the decision taken by the FTC and the court decisions taken regarding the lawsuit filed by employers against it will be presented sequentially below:
• FTC – Final Rule Prohibiting Non-Compete Agreements³¹
The FTC published its Final Rule in April 2024 prohibiting non-compete agreements made between employers and employees nationwide for the purpose of promoting competition, protecting employees’ freedom to change jobs and offering new job opportunities and thus protecting customer welfare. In this decision, the FTC evaluated that having employers sign non-compete agreements constitutes an unfair practice and therefore violates the FTC Act. Additionally, it evaluated that employers have effective alternatives other than non-compete agreements to protect their investments and prevent sensitive information exchange, such as confidentiality agreements (NDAs), and that more than 95% of employees are already covered by NDAs. Consequently, with the Final Rule, the making of all non-compete agreements for all employees including senior executives after the effective date has been prohibited. On the other hand, for existing agreements, the FTC adopted a different approach for senior executives than for other employees. Accordingly, the FTC determined that existing non-compete agreements may remain in force for senior executives since they represent less than 0.75% of the market. Additionally, an obligation has been imposed on employers to notify workers other than senior executives bound by an existing contract that such a contract will not be enforced in the future.
• Texas District Court – Preliminary Injunction Decision³²
The United States Northern District of Texas Court (Court), in the case of RYAN LLC v. FTC on 20 August, invalidated the FTC’s Final Rule prohibiting non-compete agreements contained in employee-employer contracts. The Court invalidated this decision on the grounds that the FTC exceeded its legal authority in enacting it and that it was arbitrary and unpredictable, thereby permitting employers to enforce existing non-compete agreements and create new ones. However, it emphasised that the appeal route remains open by stating that the legal process regarding the Final Rule has not been fully concluded.
• Texas District Court – Final Decision³³
In line with the preliminary injunction decision, the Texas District Court (Court), in its final decision, invalidated the FTC’s Final Rule and ruled that employers may continue to enforce existing non-compete agreements with their employees and may even create new agreements. Consequently, in the final decision rendered by the Texas Court, it was clearly stated that the FTC’s Final Rule was contrary to law and its execution must be stayed. However, although the Final Rule was invalidated on appeal, the anti-competitive effect of non-compete provisions contained in employment contracts in the labour market continues to be debated.
CONCLUSION
Labour markets have today become one of the direct areas of intervention of competition law. Together with the decisions taken by the Competition Board particularly after 2022, wage-fixing and no-poaching agreements are evaluated as anti-competitive by object, thus violations of a cartel nature. This approach indicates an important transformation with regard to protecting employees’ freedom to change jobs and labour mobility. With respect to non-compete provisions contained in employment contracts, the FTC’s Final Rule prohibiting such provisions and the Texas court’s invalidation decision demonstrate that the matters of whether these provisions can be evaluated as anti-competitive agreements and whether they can be completely prohibited or not are still legally debated. This situation shows that the points of interaction between labour law and competition law need to be addressed increasingly more carefully. On the other hand, competition in labour markets can also be affected not only through horizontal agreements but also through merger and acquisition transactions. Indeed, as in the Microsoft & Inflection example, the substantial transfer of an undertaking’s key employees has been evaluated by the relevant authorities not as simple staff mobility but as a de facto acquisition transaction and has been subjected to competition law scrutiny in this scope. This decision reveals that employee transfers may now also be a subject of structural scrutiny. Consequently, undertakings need to address all practices and contract provisions relating to the labour market not only from the perspective of labour law but also from the perspective of competition law. Finally, the Labour Guide published by the Competition Authority in Turkey stands out as an important tool for ensuring jurisprudential consistency in this field and determines the fundamental framework regarding the protection of competition in labour markets.
1 United States and the State of Arizona v. Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Association and AzHHA Service Corporation, 22 May 2007. https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-and-state-arizona-v-arizona-hospital-and-healthcare-association-and-azhha-service-corp
2 DOJ – U.S. v. Adobe Systems, Inc., et al., 24 September 2010. https://www.justice.gov/atr/case/us-v-adobe-systems-inc-et-al
3 Per se violation means “violation in itself” and refers to situations where an act is accepted as a violation clearly with an object-based approach without requiring any additional evaluation.
4 FTC & DOJ Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals, October 2016.
5 FTC & DOJ Antitrust Guidelines for Business Activities Affecting Workers, 16 January 2025.
6 Competition Board’s decision dated 28.07.2005 and numbered 05-49/710-195
7 Competition Board’s decision dated 03.03.2011 and numbered 11-12/226-76
8 Competition Board’s decision dated 26.05.2011 and numbered 11-32/650-201
9 Competition Board’s decision dated 02.01.2020 and numbered 20-01/3-2
10 Competition Board’s decision dated 24.02.2022 and numbered 22-10/152-62
11 Competition Board’s decision dated 24.04.2024 and numbered 24-20/466-196
12 Nezir Furkan Kıran, Competition Law Practices in the Labour Market p.33.
13 Ibid. p.38.
14 Rule of reason analysis is an effects-based approach form where market structure and emerging results are taken into consideration in the evaluation of undertaking behaviours.
15 Competition Board’s decision dated 26.07.2023 and numbered 23-34/649-218
16 Competition Board’s decision dated 27.02.2024 and numbered 24-10/170-66
17 Competition Board’s decision dated 16.04.2024
18 Competition Board’s decision dated 24.04.2024 and numbered 24-20/466-196
19 Competition Board’s decision dated 12.12.2024 and numbered 24-53/1175-M / Competition Authority Announcement dated 08.01.2025
20 Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248 F 3d 131 (3rd Cir. 2001).
21 Kingfisher/ Großlabour, Case IV/M.1482 (1999) and ICI/Williams, Case IV/M.1167 (1998)
22 Nezir Furkan Kıran, Competition Law Practices in the Labour Market p.62
23 Competition Board’s decision dated 17.11.2003 and numbered 03-74/899-383; decision dated 4.12.2008 and numbered 08-69/1124-440.
24 United States v. Knorr-Bremse AG and Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation, No. 1:18-cv-00747 (D.D.C. 2018) and Helmerich&Payne International Drilling Co., v. Schlumberger Technology Corporation (Case No.17-CV-358-GKF-FHM), 26.12.2017.
25 FTC – Press Release 23 April, 2024. https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2024/04/ftc-announces-rule-banning-noncompetes
26 Guide on Competition Violations in Labour Markets, Competition Board decision dated 21.11.2024 and numbered 24-49/1087-RM(4)
27 Nezir Furkan Kıran, Competition Law Practices in the Labour Market, page 44.
28 European Commission announcement, 18.09.2024 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_4727
29 CMA decision, 24.10.2024. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6719ff5f549f63039436b3c8/__Full_text_decision__.pdf, Bundeskartellamt press release, 29.11.2024 https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Meldung/EN/Pressemitteilungen/2024/29_11_2024_Microsoft.html
30 Deslanes v. McDonald’s USA Amicus Brief, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/2022-11-09-Deslandes-v.-McDonald%27s-USA-Amicus-Brief-FINAL.pdf
31 FTC, Non-Compete Clause Rule, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/noncompete-rule.pdf
32 Ryan, LLC v. Federal Trade Commission, No. 3:24-CV-00986-E, 3 July 2024 https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.txnd.389064/gov.uscourts.txnd.389064.153.0_4.pdf
33 Northern District of Texas, final judgment on RYAN LLC v. FTC, 20 August 2024. *gov.uscourts.txnd.389064.211.0_4.pdf (courtlistener.com) (Texas Court Final Judgment)